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Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and the
Power to Enjoin the IRS
INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to preserve a business's viability long enough
to turn the business around, an officer of a hypothetical busi-
ness corporation uses employee withholding taxes and FICA
(Social Security) taxes collected to pay current expenses in-
stead of turning them over to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). Unfortunately, the business continues to fail and the of-
ficer discovers that the business must file for reorganization in
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.1 As required by the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor busi-
ness submits a reorganization plan, describing the debts that
must be paid and the applicable repayment schedule.2 Pursu-
ant to another provision of the Bankruptcy Code, requiring full
payment of all "unsecured claims of governmental units"3 over
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982).
2. Id- §§ 1121-1129. Section 1123, in particular, governs the contents of
the reorganization plan. Id- § 1123.
3. Allowable unsecured claims of governmental units are accorded sev-
enth priority under § 507(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code. "Seventh, allowed
unsecured claims of governmental units only to the extent that such claims
are for... (C) a tax required to be collected or withheld and for which the
debter is liable in whatever capacity." 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (Supp. II 1984)
(emphasis added). FICA and employee witholding taxes come within the pri-
ority provision of § 507(a)(7):
The phrase "in whatever capacity" operates to include the liability of
a responsible officer under the Internal Revenue Code (section 6672)
for income taxes or for the employee's share of social security taxes
which that officer was responsible for withholding from the wages of
employees and paying to the Treasury, although he was not himself
the employer. This priority will also operate when a person found to
be a responsible officer has himself filed under title 11, and the prior-
ity will cover the debtor's responsible officer liability regardless of the
tax year to which the tax relates.
3 COLLR ON BANKRUPTCY 507.04, at 507-41 to 507-42 (L. King 15th ed. 1984)
(citing United States v. Sotelo, 426 U.S. 268 (1978); 124 CONG. REC.'S17,429
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. H11,113 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)) [here-
inafter cited as COLLIER].
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a period not exceeding six years,4 the debtor corporation pro-
poses to make full payment of all back taxes owed to the IRS.
The bankruptcy court then reviews the hypothetical corpora-
tion's proposed plan, and, finding that it satisfies the require-
ments of the Bankruptcy Code, the court confirms the plan.5
The debtor corporation then begins to make timely payments
in accordance with the plan.
Meanwhile, the IRS becomes dissatisfied with the extended
repayment schedule, preferring instead an immediate recovery
of the back taxes owed to it. The IRS therefore notifies the
president or chairman of the debtor corporation that it intends
to impose a penalty equal to the amount of unpaid taxes pursu-
ant to Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 6672(a). This sec-
tion permits the IRS to assess a 100% penalty against the
officer of a corporation that has failed to turn over to the IRS
taxes such as employee withholding and FICA taxes.6 In the
context of a reorganization, this section allows the IRS to col-
lect the unpaid taxes immediately rather than wait for payment
pursuant to the reorganization plan.7 The hypothetical debtor
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982).
5. Confirmation of a reorganization plan is governed by § 1129(a)(9)(C)
of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides in relevant part:
[W]ith respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(6) [fol-
lowing the 1984 amendments this became section 507(a)(7) but re-
mained uncorrected in this cross reference within the Code] of this
title, the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim
deferred cash payments, over a period not exceeding six years after
the date of assessment of such claim, of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982).
6. I.R.C. § 6672(a) provides in relevant part:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over
any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or
truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in
any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof,
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected,
or not accounted for and paid over.
26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1982). I.R.C. § 6671(b) defines "person": "The term 'per-
son,' as used in this subchapter, includes an officer or employee of a corpora-
tion, or a member or employee of a partnership who as such officer, employee,
or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation
occurs." 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b) (1982).
7. The IRS has an express policy of using the § 6672(a) penalty to collect
taxes immediately rather than wait for periodic payments over a six-year
period.
The 100-percent penalty . . . will be used only as a collection de-
vice.... [Ihe 100-percent penalty may be asserted ... whenever such
taxes cannot be immediately collected from the corporation itself....
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corporation immediately petitions the bankruptcy court for an
injunction to prevent the IRS from assessing the 100% tax pen-
alty against its corporate officer. In court, the IRS argues that
the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction over a
nondebtor and, in the alternative, that the Anti-Injunction Act s
bars the bankruptcy court from enjoining the IRS collection of
the tax penalty. In response, the debtor corporation, on behalf
of its corporate officer, takes the position that the bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction over the nondebtor corporate officer by
virtue of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the reorgani-
zation plan. Moreover, the court's power to enjoin the IRS
from collecting the tax penalty may be necessary to protect the
corporation's reorganization plan.
A court faced with this representative fact pattern9 must
deal with two controversial issues.' 0 It must first decide
whether a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine the
validity of a tax penalty assessed against a nondebtor corporate
The withheld income and employment taxes or collected excise taxes
will be collected only once, whether from the corporation, from one
or more of its responsible persons, or from the corporation and one or
more of its responsible persons.
1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, ADMINISTRATION (CCH) P-5-60 (approved May
30, 1984).
The IRS stated to one court that it intended to collect the tax amount
only once; once the taxes were paid in full, the IRS would not continue to col-
lect via the reorganization plan. United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re
Huckabee Auto Co.), 46 Bankr. 741, 742 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (citing United States
v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279 n.12 (1978)), affd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
8. The Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a), provides in relevant part:
[N1o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or
not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982).
9. This fact pattern is substantially similar to the facts in United States
v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46 Bankr. 741 (M.D. Ga.
1985), aff'd 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986); Jon Co. v. United States (In re Jon
Co.), 30 Bankr. 831 (D. Colo. 1983); In re Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45
Bankr. 202 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); Datair Sys. Corp. v. Starkey (In re Datair
Sys. Corp.), 37 Bankr. 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); H & R Ice Co. v. United
States (In re H & R Ice Co.), 24 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
10. Two additional issues are likely to be raised in cases involving bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction to enjoin the IRS from collecting a tax penalty from a
nondebtor officer of a debtor corporation. The bankruptcy court must deter-
mine, first, whether the debtor has standing to seek an injunction, and second,
whether sovereign immunity precludes an injunction. These issues were
raised in Huckabee at the bankruptcy and appellate court levels, although not
in the district court. In the initial proceeding in which the bankruptcy court
held it had jurisdiction to hear the case, both the court and.the IRS agreed
that standing to litigate is a required aspect of a "case or controversy" within
the meaning of article III, section 2 of the Constitution. In re Huckabee Auto
1986] 1281
1282 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1279
officer of a debtor corporation.1 Assuming that it does have ju-
Co., 38 Bankr. 188, 190 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968)). They disagreed on whether this constitutional standard was met.
The IRS argued that the debtor lacked standing to contest a claim against
the corporate officers because standing requires that the plaintiff allege " 'such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness' will follow" and it claimed that an action against a third party is
not sufficiently personal. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
The bankruptcy court held, however, that the debtor had standing, because
the debtor's ability to reorganize would be adversely affected by the proposed
100% penalty against the nondebtor corporate officers. Id In the words of the
court, "[g]enerally, standing depends on the particular circumstances of a
case." I&L (citing United States v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153 (1953)).
The court concluded that "[t]he relevant inquiry... was whether the corpo-
rate debtor's ability to reorganize would be affected by the assessment of the
penalty." Id (citing Jon Co. v. United States (In re Jon Co.), 30 Bankr. 831 (D.
Colo. 1983)) (bankruptcy court could enjoin the IRS under similar circum-
stances).
The issue of sovereign immunity was a second additional issue raised in
the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit in the Huckabee case. This doctrine would
generally preclude suits against the government unless Congress expressly
waived sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity cannot be waived by impli-
cation. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). The Huckabees ar-
gued that sovereign immunity is waived by virtue of § 106 of the Bankruptcy
Code. See Brief of Appellants Leo B. Huckabee, Jr., Leo B. Huckabee, III, and
Huckabee Auto Co. at 35-36, United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huck-
abee Auto Co.), 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986). Section 106 states that a "gov-
ernmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to
any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate and
that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence out of which such govern-
mental unit's claim arose." 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1982). The IRS, however, ar-
gued that the government had not waived sovereign immunity. See Brief for
the Appellee at 38-39, United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huckabee
Auto Co.), 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986). Because nondebtors cannot claim
that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over their dispute with the IRS, the
IRS claimed that a waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot occur.
Id
11. Several cases uphold bankruptcy court jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine the validity of the tax penalty on the nondebtor corporate officer of a
debtor corporation. See Jon Co. v. United States (In re Jon Co.), 30 Bankr.
831, 833 (D. Colo. 1983); Precision Colors, Inc. v. Third Nat'l Bank and Trust
Co. (In re Precision Colors, Inc.), 36 Bankr. 429, 431 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); H
& R Ice Co. v. United States (In re H & R Ice Co.) 24 Bankr. 28, 31-32 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1982).
Several other cases, however, reject bankruptcy court jurisdiction to hear
and determine the validity of the tax. See United States v. Huckabee Auto Co.
(In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46 Bankr. 741, 745 (M.D. Ga. 1985), affld, 783 F.2d
1546 (11th Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction over nondebtor cor-
porate officer of debtor corporation); United States v. Rayson Sports, Inc. (In
re Rayson Sports, Inc.) 44 Bankr. 280, 282-83 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (nondebtor corpo-
rate officers of debtor corporation cannot obtain injunction against IRS collec-
tion of I.R.C. § 6672(a) tax penalty); Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc. v. United
States (In re Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc.) 49 Bankr. 779, 780-81 (Bankr. N.D.
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risdiction, the court must then decide whether the bankruptcy
court has power to enjoin the IRS from imposing such tax
penalties.12
This Note examines the conflict posed in the above hypo-
thetical between bankruptcy and tax law.13 Courts at various
W. Va. 1985) (bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to determine the tax liability
of a nondebtor).
12. Several cases hold that the bankruptcy court has the power to enjoin
the IRS collection of a tax. See Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741, 744
(8th Cir. 1975) (bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to determine dis-
chargeability of debtor's federal tax debt and to enjoin IRS collection efforts
pending determination); Jon Co. v. United States (In re Jon Co.), 30 Bankr.
831, 834-35 (D. Colo. 1983) (bankruptcy court has power to enjoin IRS collec-
tion of tax penalty against officers and directors of debtor corporation); In re
The Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45 Bankr. 202, 207 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1984) ("this court joins the Bostwick court"); Datair Sys. Corp. v. Starkey (In
re Datair Sys. Corp.), 37 Bankr. 690, 696 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1983) (if debtors
could prove (1) irreparable harm to bankruptcy estate unless injunction was
issued, (2) strong likelihood of success on the merits, (3) minimal or no harm
to other party, and (4) injunction better suited to public interests, then Anti-
Injunction Act would not preclude bankruptcy court from enjoining IRS impo-
sition of § 6672(a) tax penalty).
Several other cases take the opposite position, holding that the bank-
ruptcy court does not have the power to enjoin the IRS. See Needham's Motor
Serv. v. Department of Treasury, IRS (In re Becker's Motor Transp., Inc.) 632
F.2d 242, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1980) (bankruptcy court cannot enjoin IRS collection
of personal tax liabilities of nondebtor corporate official, even if those liabili-
ties derived from corporation's tax liabilities), cert denied 450 U.S. 916 (1981);
Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1218 (7th Cir.) (I.R.C. § 6672(a) tax
penalty separate and distinct personal tax liability not subject to bankruptcy
court action), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970); United States v. Rayson Sports,
Inc. (In re Rayson Sports, Inc.), 44 Bankr. 280, 283 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (nondebtor
corporate officers of debtor corporation cannot obtain injunction against IRS
collection of I.R.C. § 6672(a) penalty); Pressimone v. IRS (In re Pressimone),
39 Bankr. 240, 243-46 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (Anti-Injunction Act precludes the issu-
ance of an injunction by the bankruptcy court).
13. Two formulations of the issues from the briefs submitted to the Elev-
enth Circuit in Huckabee reflect the basic jurisdictional conflict-whether or
not the tax is on the debtor. The statement of the issue from the appellants'
brief is
[w]hether the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Georgia (the Bankruptcy Court) had subject mattter juris-
diction to hear and determine whether Appellee, the Internal Reve-
nue Service, (IRS) could collect 100% penalty claims for allegedly due
and unpaid federal taxes against corporate officers of Appellant,
Huckabee Auto Company, (the Company or the Debtor) when such
actions would have a severe adverse impact on the Debtor's rehabili-
tation and payments under its confirmed Third Modified Plan of Re-
organization, as Amended (the Plan)?
Brief of Appellants Leo B. Huckabee, Jr., Leo B. Huckabee, III, and Huckabee
Auto Co. at 1, United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.)




levels in nearly all jurisdictions have dealt with different as-
pects of these issues, but they have not agreed on the appropri-
ate resolution.14 Part I discusses recent legislative and case law
changes in bankruptcy court jurisdiction, arguing that bank-
ruptcy courts have jurisdiction to hear cases concerning the va-
lidity of tax penalties assessed against nondebtor corporate
officers of debtor corporations. Part II sets forth statutory and
case law governing bankruptcy court power to enjoin the IRS
from tax collection. It asserts that bankruptcy courts have au-
thority to enjoin the collection of tax penalties. The Note con-
cludes that bankruptcy court jurisdiction and injunctive power
in tax penalty cases is necessary to fulfill the rehabilitative pur-
pose of the bankruptcy laws and to protect the respective inter-
ests of the the debtor, the government, and other creditors.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT
Recent changes in bankruptcy court jurisdiction, reflected
in the bankruptcy statutes, resulted from the 1982 Supreme
Court decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co. 15 In Marathon, the Court held unconstitu-
tional certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
which vested broad jurisdictional power in the bankruptcy
courts.16 Specifically, the Court struck down the power of non-
article III federal judges to determine issues arising in bank-
ruptcy based on state law causes of action, such as the tort and
contract claims at issue in Marathon.'7
[w]hether the District Court correctly held that the Bankruptcy
Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the assessment or collection of the
separate liabilities imposed by Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.), upon the persons who were responsible for
the corporate debtor's failure to see that withholding taxes were paid
over to the Government, when the responsible persons had filed no
petitions for relief under the bankruptcy laws and the only debtor
before the court was the corporate employer.
Brief for the Appellee at 1, United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., (In re Hucka-
bee Auto Co.), 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
14. See supra note 11.
15. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
16. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87. Under the 1978 Act, the bankruptcy courts
became adjuncts to the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982). Jurisdic-
tion over bankruptcy cases and proceedings within each district was conferred
on the district court but to be exercised by the bankruptcy judges exclusively.
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982). The Supreme Court held this provision unconstitu-
tional. See Marathon, 450 U.S. at 87. For a general discussion of the legislative
history of the 1978 Act, see Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy
Law, 38 DE PAUL L. REV. 941, 941, 957-60 (1979).
17. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court identified three situa-
1284 [Vol. 70:1279
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To cure the constitutional problems of the 1978 Act, Con-
gress enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984.18 The Act gave district courts, with minor
reservations, original jurisdiction over title 11 bankruptcy cases
and designated the bankruptcy courts to exercise this jurisdic-
tion.19 Congress delimited bankruptcy court jurisdiction by
distinguishing between "core" and "non-core" bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.20 The Act provides for bankruptcy court jurisdiction
tions in which article III of the Constitution does not bar creation of legislative
courts with the broad powers granted to article III courts: territorial courts,
courts-martial, and legislative or administrative courts for adjudication of
"public rights." The bankruptcy courts, as adjuncts to the district courts, were
deemed comparable to legislative courts. The Court held that it had not found
a grant of exceptional power to permit the broad exercise of power by the
bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act. Id at 58-71.
18. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (amending scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. (Supp. II 1984), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 150-158, 1334 (West Supp. 1985)). Section
104(a) of the 1984 Act allows the bankruptcy judges in each judicial district to
exercise authority in hearing and determining cases, but no longer as adjuncts
to the district court. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1985). For a detailed
explanation of the legislative history of the 1984 Act, see 1 COLLIER, supra
note 3, I 3.01, at 3-6 to 3-9. The following statement by Senator Orrin G. Hatch
illustrates the curative purpose behind the 1984 Act:
Each of the three titles of this bill will have a dramatic impact on
fair and equitable bankruptcy administration. Title I corrects the con-
stitutional flaw discerned by the Supreme Court in the Marathon case
which prohibited bankruptcy judges, who lack life tenure, from decid-
ing certain bankruptcy cases grounded in State law. Under this bill,
bankruptcy judges will act as article I adjuncts to Federal district
courts in the resolution of core bankruptcy proceedings.
130 CONG. REC. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 576, 590 (statement of Sen. Hatch). For a recent exposition
of bankruptcy law after the 1984 Act, see Symposium On Bankruptcy, 38
VAND. L. REV. 665 (1985).
19. The statute specifically in question in Marathon, 28 U.S.C. § 1471
(1982), has been superseded by 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 157, 1334 (West Supp. 1985).
Subsections 1334(a) and (b) are identical to former § 1471(a) and (b).
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the dis-
trict courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusivejurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the dis-
trict courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under title 11.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West Supp. 1985). Section 157 performs a similar function
as former § 1471(c), but it divides the jurisdiction of the district and bank-
ruptcy courts to ensure that only article III judges decide issues of state law
related to a case in bankruptcy. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp. 1985). For
additional discussion of this provision, see 1 COLLIER, supra note 3, % 3.01, at 3-
34 to 3-39.
20. Section 157 provides, in relevant part:
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over core bankruptcy proceedings, but retains jurisdiction over
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title
11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or re-
lated to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy
judges for the district.
(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under ti-
tle 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a
case under title 11 ....
28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp. 1985). Collier explains the confusing distinc-
tions made in these sections:
Note that "proceedings... related to a case under title 11" which are
referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157(a) are not in-
cluded within the language of section 157(b)(1). This is so because the
constitutional ability of bankruptcy, judges to hear such matters was
found lacking in Marathon. There seemingly is no such thing as a
core matter which is "related to" cases under title 11. Core proceed-
ings, it seems, are those which arise in title 11 cases or arise under ti-
tle 11.
Representative Kastenmeier, while discussing the Kastenneier-
Kindness amendment was careful to articulate his thoughts as to just
how all-encompassing the term "core proceeding" was intended to be:
"The logic of the article III cases also suggests that bankruptcy judges
may exercise broad powers in all core bankruptcy proceedings.
Whether an adjunct may exercise broad powers or only limited pow-
ers depends upon whether Congress has the power to make substan-
tive law over the matters to be adjudicated. Congress may not modify
indirectly, through influence over the adjunct, those rights it cannot
modify directly.
In this respect, State law rights arising in core bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are functionally equivalent to congressionally created rights,
because Congress has the power to modify State law rights in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Unlike the States, Congress may impair the obli-
gations of contracts through the bankruptcy clause. Indeed, the very
purpose of bankruptcy is to modify the rights of the debtors and cred-
itors, and the bankruptcy code authorizes the bankruptcy court to ab-
rogate or modify State-created obligations in many ways."
1 COLLIER, supra note 3, 3.01, at 3-26 to 3-27 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. Hll0
(daily ed. March 20, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)). In discussing the
conference report, Representative Kastenmeier noted that the conference re-
port largely adopts the House's position that only a few cases, such as tort and
contract claims, are non-core proceedings. See 130 CONG. REc. H7492 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 579, 579 (state-
ment of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("The conference report largely rejects the Senate
limitations on the tasks which are to be performed by a bankruptcy judge.
The report states that a narrow category of cases [i.e. tort or contract claims
involving determinations of state law] are not to be construed as core proceed-
ings."); see also Hendel and Reinhardt, Evolution of Bankruptcy Court Juris-
diction After the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
90 COM. L.J. 272, 273-75 (1985). According to Philip J. Hendel and Joseph H.
Reinhardt, the bankruptcy judge decides whether a matter is a "core" or "non-
core" proceeding. The current trend, consistent with the position of Represen-
tative Kastenneier, shows a liberal construction of the definition of a core pro-
ceeding by bankruptcy judges. Id. at 273-74.
BANKRUPTCY
non-core proceedings in the district courts.21 "Core proceedings
include... matters concerning the administration of the estate;
allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate... and
other proceedings affecting . . .the adjustment of the debtor-
creditor... relationship.122 Non-core proceedings are proceed-
ings related to a proceeding under title 11,23 as were the tort
and contract claims of Marathon.
In determining whether a proceeding is core or non-core, a
bankruptcy court is necessarily deciding whether it has jurisdic-
tion over a matter. Thus, the bankruptcy court must decide, as
a threshold issue, whether a determination of the appropriate-
ness of the IRS's imposition of a tax penalty against a
nondebtor corporate officer of a debtor corporation is a core
proceeding or a non-core proceeding. Determining the amount
or legality of a tax on a debtor is clearly a core proceeding.24
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
22. Id. § 157(b)(2)(A),(B), (0); see also King, Jurisdiction and Procedure
Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 686-96
(1985) (broad grant of jurisdiction of § 157(b)(2) calls into question the consti-
tutionality of the 1984 Act).
23. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(3) (West Supp. 1985) (non-core proceedings
include but are not limited to proceedings whose "resolution may be affected
by State law"); id § 157(c)(1) (requiring district court to enter any final order
or judgment in proceedings which are related to cases under title 11 but are
not core proceedings).
24. Id. § 157(b)(2)(L) states that core proceedings include confirmations
of reorganization plans. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982) requires all priority
claims specified in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (Supp. II 1984), including tax claims,
be included in a reorganization plan before it can be confirmed. The Internal
Revenue Code specifically provides that the penalty is to be considered a tax.
The penalties and liabilities provided by this subchapter shall be paid
upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and shall be assessed and
collected in the same manner as taxes. Except as otherwise provided,
any reference in this title to "tax" imposed by this title shall be
deemed also to refer to the penalties and liabilities provided by this
subchapter.
26 U.S.C § 6671(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court has power to deter-
mine the amount or legality of any tax. Section 505(a)(1) of the Code provides
in relevant part:
[Tihe court may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine
or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not
previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not con-
tested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal
of competent jurisdiction.
11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982). Case law also demonstrates that the bankruptcy
court has power to determine the validity of a tax. See, e.g., Bostwick v. United
States, 521 F.2d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1975). Bostwick is the leading case upholding
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to hear and determine a tax debt's dis-
chargeability. In Bostwick, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's
1986] 1287
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Categorization may be much more difficult, however, when the
proceeding involves determining the amount or legality of a tax
penalty imposed on a nondebtor. When such a penalty is im-
posed on a corporate officer for nonpayment of taxes owed by a
corporation, the bankruptcy court must decide whether the tax
penalty assessment against the corporate officer is, essentially,
a tax on the debtor corporation. Relevant case law displays two
lines of analysis leading to contrary results.25 On one hand, if
the jurisdictional requirement for categorization as a core pro-
ceeding is read literally, the tax is not on the debtor but on the
nondebtor corporate officer and the proceeding is therefore not
a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court has jurisdic-
tion. On the other hand, if the requirement is not read liter-
ally, the tax may be considered to be on the debtor thereby
invoking the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.
Courts that have not allowed bankruptcy court jurisdiction,
interpreting the tax-on-the-debtor requirement literally, have
determination that it had jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of a
tax debt where the United States had not filed proof of claim and to enjoin the
collection of the taxes. Id at 744-47. The case involved two individual debtors
who filed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy listing the United States as a cred-
itor for $68,400 in unpaid taxes. The United States failed to file proof of
claims, which ordinarily are required of creditors if they wish to receive any
payment from a debtor in bankruptcy. The debtors requested the bankruptcy
court to determine the dischargeability of the tax debts. The United States
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the bankruptcy court lacked juris-
diction. The bankruptcy court rejected the argument. Id. at 742. The Eighth
Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's conclusion. Id at 743-44. The court rea-
soned that the jurisdiction issue turned on the interpretation of § 2a(2A) of
the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act which gave the bankruptcy court power to deter-
mine the validity of any tax involved in a bankruptcy case. Id at 742. Section
2a(2A), interpreted by the Eighth Circuit in Bostwick, became § 505(a) and (b)
of the current Bankruptcy Code with only stylistic changes. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 505 (1982). The court briefly reviewed the legislative history of the provision
and concluded that the plain language of the provision was intended to con-
trol. Bostwick, 521 F.2d at 744. It therefore held that the bankruptcy court
had power to determine any unpaid tax at issue in a bankruptcy case. Id- Tax
debts receive priority treatment in the settlement of a bankruptcy estate. See
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (Supp. II 1984). The Bankruptcy Code provides specifi-
cally for payment over time of unsecured claims of governmental units, includ-
ing the I.R.C. § 6672(a) tax penalty, as part of the plan for reorganization. See
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982) (quoted in relevant part supra note 5). This
section provides for payment of claims specified in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7), which
includes the I.R.C. § 6672(a) tax penalty. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (Supp. II
1984). For further discussion of § 507(a)(7), see supra note 3. In addition, the
bankruptcy court has the power to issue any "order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the Bankruptcy
Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
25. See infra notes 26-50 and accompanying text.
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generally focused on two issues. They reason that Congress did
not intend the Bankruptcy Code provision permitting the bank-
ruptcy court to determine the amount or legality of any tax to
apply to taxes assessed against nondebtors, 26 however closely
connected to the debtor. As one court held, although the tax
liabilities of a debtor may be clearly within the purview of the
bankruptcy court, the personal tax or tax penalty liabilities of
the nondebtor are not.27 The I.R.C. section 6672(a) tax penalty
on the nondebtor officers is separate and distinct from the
debtor corporation's obligation to pay the employee withhold-
ing taxes.28 Therefore, the proceeding is a non-core proceeding
over which the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction.
Additionally, courts that do not recognize bankruptcy court
jurisdiction in this situation focus on the purpose of I.R.C. sec-
tion 6672(a), stating that the revenue collection goals of the tax
system are of primary importance.2 9 As one court emphasized,
employee tax withholdings are funds to be held in trust for the
United States.30 If an employer mnisappropriates these funds,
the employees are still credited for the amounts and the gov-
ernment bears the entire loss.3 1 Because of the seriousness of
26. See, e.g., Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc. v. United States (In re Pierce
Coal and Constr.), 49 Bankr. 779 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1985). The Pierce court
held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the nondebtor corporate officer's
injunction request, stating that "[t]he legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 505
reveals that Congress intended that bankruptcy courts be permitted to deter-
mine the tax liability of the debtor." I&. at 780.
27. See United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46
Bankr. 741, 744 (M.D. Ga. 1985), affd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986). In af-
firming the district court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit stated: "The jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy courts encompasses determinations of the tax liabilities
of debtors who file petitions for relief under the bankruptcy laws. It does not
extend to the separate liabilities of taxpayers who are not debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code." Huckabee, 783 F.2d at 1549.
28. See Huckabee, 46 Bankr. at 743-44. Whether or not the IRS has a pol-
icy of using the tax penalty to collect immediately but only once, see supra
note 7, it still has the statutory power to impose the penalty in addition to col-
lecting the taxes over time. See id; see also Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc. v.
United States (In re Pierce Coal and Constr.), 49 Bankr. 779, 781 (Bankr. N.D.
W. Va. 1985).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Rayson Sports, Inc. (In re Rayson Sports,
Inc.), 44 Bankr. 280, 282 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (purpose of § 7421(a) is to permit the
government to "collect taxes as expeditiously as possible, with a minimum of
pre-enforcement judicial interference") (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon,
416 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1974)).
30. See United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46
Bankr. 741, 743 (M.D. Ga. 1985), affd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986); 26 U.S.C.
§ 7501 (1982).
31. See Huckabee, 46 Bankr. at 743; 26 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3403 (1982).
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the revenue loss, I.R.C. section 6672(a) has been interpreted as
a broad civil penalty for the conduct. 32 Tax penalties generally
are viewed as having a deterrent function, no less important
than the rehabilitative function of the bankruptcy system.
33
Because of the paramount goal of revenue collection, courts,
therefore, also reject the argument that I.R.C. section 6672(a) is
to be subordinated to the Bankruptcy Code.
34
In contrast, a nonliteral reading of the requirement that
the tax be on the debtor, which permits bankruptcy court juris-
diction, allows the bankruptcy court to assess the debtor corpo-
ration's situation and to consider more fully the factors
affecting the successful completion of the reorganization plan.3 5
For example, the bankruptcy court in H & R Ice Company v.
United States (In re H & R Ice Company)3 6 held that it had ju-
risdiction to determine the validity of a tax penalty assessment
32. See Huckabee, 46 Bankr. at 743.
33. See Needham's Motor Serv., Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, IRS
(In re Becker's Motor Transp., Inc.), 632 F.2d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing
World Scope Publishers, Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 640, 642 (2d Cir. 1965)),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
34. See United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46
Bankr. 741, 743 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (citing Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210,
1218 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970)), affd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.
1986). The Monday court stated that the I.R.C. § 6672(a) tax penalty is in-
dependent of the employer's obligation to pay taxes and, therefore, not gov-
erned by the same rules. Monday, 421 F.2d at 1218. The Huckabee court,
following Monday, concluded that "[a]bsent a clear directive from Congress,
this court will not sanction the imposition of a judicially created limitation
upon the power of the government to seek an assessment of a § 6672 penalty
simply because the IRS may be able to collect the tax from the debtor over a
six year period." Huckabee, 46 Bankr. at 744.
35. See, e.g., Jon Co. v. United States (In re Jon Co.), 30 Bankr. 831 (D.
Colo. 1983). Jon involved the IRS imposition of the 100% penalty against
nondebtor officers of a debtor company in reorganization under Chapter 11.
The debtor sought enforcement of the automatic stay provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982), while a reorganization plan was arranged.
Id. at 832. In response to the IRS argument that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction over the tax penalty assessed against a nondebtor, the district
court stated that, given the potentially adverse effect on the debtor, the juris-
dictional grant to bankruptcy courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 could not be inter-
preted so narrowly. Id. at 833. The court bolstered this conclusion by quoting
11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982), which permits the bankruptcy court to determine
the amount or legality of any tax, fine or penalty relating to a tax. Jon, 30
Bankr. at 833. For the text of 11 U.S.C. § 505 (a)(1), see supra note 24. See
also Datair Sys. Corp. v. Starkey (In re Datair Sys. Corp.), 37 Bankr. 690
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). In Datair, the bankruptcy court held it had jurisdic-
tion to determine whether to enjoin the IRS imposition of the 100% penalty
against the nondebtor corporate officers of the debtor corporation because of
the potential adverse effect on the debtor's reorganization. Id. at 694.
36. 24 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
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because the jurisdictional grant of section 505(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code 37 does not by its terms limit determination of
tax liability to the debtor.38 The court reasoned that when
section 505(a)(1) is read in connection with 28 U.S.C. section
1471, 39 the tax assessed against the corporate officers was
within its jurisdiction if the tax affected the reorganization and
rehabilitation of the debtor company.40
In another case, the bankruptcy court construed section
505(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code as specifically vesting bank-
ruptcy courts with jurisdiction to determine tax liabilities.41
The bankruptcy court referred to the legislative history of sec-
tion 505 as seemingly supportive of the IRS position, but deter-
mined that the plain meaning of the statute should prevail.42
Because the penalty provision is characterized as a tax,43 and
the tax properly flowed from the operations of the debtor cor-
poration, the bankruptcy court held that it had jurisdiction to
determine whether an injunction was necessary to protect the
37. For the text of 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982), see supra note 24.
38. H&RIce, 24Bankr. at30.
39. The court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a), (b)
(West Supp. 1985) is the current applicable provision and is identical to
§ 1471(a), (b).
40. H & R Ice Co., 24 Bankr. at 31. Section 105 of the Bankrutpcy Code,
not mentioned by the court, also gives the bankruptcy court the power to pro-
tect the estate in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
41. In re Huckabee Auto Co., 38 Bankr. 188, 193 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984).
42. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 356, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5963, 6312 ("subsections (a) and (b)
'permit determination by the bankruptcy court of any unpaid tax liability of
the debtor'") (emphasis added); 124 CONG. REC. H11,110 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6436, 6490 (statement of
Rep. Edwards) (" 'The House Amendment authorizes the bankruptcy court to
rule on the merits of any tax claim involving an unpaid tax, fine, or penalty
relating to a tax, or any addition to a tax, of the debtor or the estate.' ") (em-
phasis added)).
43. See 26 U.S.C. § 6671(a) (1982) (quoted supra note 24); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(7)(C) (Supp. II 1984) (providing that a penalty related to a tax claim
under any section of paragraph (7) will also receive seventh priority if such
penalty is in compensation for actual pecuniary loss). Section 507(a)(7)(C)
clearly includes the § 6672(a) tax penalty. Because the I.R.C. § 6672(a) penalty
is a tax and not a punitive measure, it is entitled to priority status.
Certain tax liabilities may, under otherwise applicable tax law, be col-
lectible in the form of a penalty. The Code thus provides that such
"penalties" are to be treated in the same manner as a tax liability. In
bankruptcy terminology, such tax liabilities are to be referred to as
pecuniary loss penalties. [If [they] are punitive in nature... [they do
not get priority status].
3 COLLIER, supra note 3, % 507.04, at 507-45 (L. King 15th ed. 1979) (citing 124




A close relationship between the debtor and the nondebtor
officer may also be sufficient to sustain bankruptcy court juris-
diction. In some situations, IRS action against an officer of a
debtor corporation can directly affect the resources available
for the debtor's reorganization. For example, the corporation's
bylaws may include an indemnification clause which requires
the company to pay any costs arising out of the business even if
such costs are assessed against an officer personally.45 Argua-
bly, an indenmification clause creates a sufficient financial con-
nection between the corporation and its officers to mandate
bankruptcy court jurisdiction. The connection is particularly
relevant if use of the indemnification clause results in the
debtor company paying the tax penalty and thereby impairs the
debtor company's rehabilitation.
Even without an indemnification clause, however, the non-
literal interpretation of the tax-on-the-debtor requirement
should apply because IRS action can affect decisions made by
the nondebtor officers concerning the debtor corporation's re-
habilitation. For example, the principal effect of a tax penalty
on the debtor may be to force the responsible corporate officer
who manages the daily affairs of the debtor corporation to
work at a salary level controlled by the IRS and substantially
below the level which had been carefully calculated in the reor-
44. In re Huckabee Auto Co., 38 Bankr. 188, 1983 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984).
45. See, e.g., Huckabee v. United States (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 43
Bankr. 306, 309 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Huck-
abee Auto. Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46 Bankr. 741 (M.D. Ga. 1985),
affd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986). The bylaws of the debtor corporation in
Huckabee indemnify each director or officer of the corporation for expenses
incurred in connection with any legal proceeding. The clause provides:
Each director or officer of the corporation and each person at its re-
quest who has served as an officer or director shall be indemnified by
this corporation against those expenses which are allowed by the laws
of the State of Georgia and which are reasonably incurred in connec-
tion with any action, suit or proceeding, pending or threatened, in
which such person may be involved by reason of his being or having
been the director or officer of this corporation.
IH The IRS did not claim that the indemnification clause was invalid, even
though it was adopted in February, 1984, approximately eight months after the
penalty was assessed (but before the bankruptcy court rendered its decision).
Id. The IRS did, on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, characterize the action as
essentially self-serving and intended merely to bolster the debtor corporation's
weak position. Brief for the Appellee at 27-28, United States v. Huckabee
Auto Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986). If valid,
however, the indemnification clause clearly places the burden of the tax pen-




ganization plan and relied on to sustain the officer during the
difficult reorganization process. Moreover, the corporate of-
ficer receiving a reduced salary at the IRS's direction would
have little incentive to seek to successfully operate, much less
rehabilitate the corporate debtor.46 The adverse impact, there-
fore, on a debtor's reorganization due to the assessment of a tax
penalty against the nondebtor corporate officer lies in the re-
duced incentive to reorganize. Debtors have a statutory option
to convert the reorganization to liquidation,4 7 which the corpo-
rate officers might exercise to pay the tax off immediately and
relieve themselves of the tax penalty.48 Because this decision is
made by the corporate officers, it is possible that if they are too
heavily burdened by personal liabilities, they will forego
reorganization.
Policy reasons support both a literal reading and a nonlit-
eral reading of the tax-on-the-debtor requirement but weigh in
favor of a nonliteral interpretation. Courts relying on the lit-
eral interpretation of the requirement recognize that Congress
has placed a high value on receipt of revenues. 49 These courts
view bankruptcy courts as primarily interested in the proper
adjustment of creditors' rights and the rehabilitation and dis-
charge of a debtor, as opposed to revenue collection, when they
determine the amount or validity of a tax penalty assessed
against a nondebtor. Although this argument has merit, it fails
to recognize that the Bankruptcy Code provides for full pay-
ment of taxes,50 so that the government does not risk losing
revenue if the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction.
Moreover, debtor rehabilitation through reorganization is a
significant goal warranting the nonliteral interpretation that
will allow a bankruptcy court to deal with the merits of a case.
46. Brief of Appellants Leo B. Huckabee, Jr., Leo B. Huckabee, M, and
Huckabee Auto Co. at 37-38, United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huck-
abee Auto Co.), 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982).
48. See supra note 7 (discussing IRS policy to collect the tax only once).
49. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1974) (over-
riding policy of the IRS is to collect revenues for the government).
Originally a criminal provision, some form of I.R.C. § 6672(a) has been in
the tax laws of the United States since the Civil War. Moran, Willfulness: Vie
Inner Sanctum or Unnecessary Element of Section 6672, 11 U. TOL. L. REV.
709, 726 (1980). Although the I.R.C. § 6672(a) tax penalty is now a civil sanc-
tion, it frequently exceeds the maximum criminal fines. Id at 714. The tax
penalty places an onerous burden on the responsible officers and emphasizes
the need to place a priority on paying over tax funds withheld from
employees.
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (Supp. II 1984).
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If bankruptcy court jurisdiction is denied, the IRS will un-
doubtedly collect the tax penalty immediately regardless of the
ultimate effect on the debtor. To be sure the penalty is used
appropriately in cases involving an estate in bankruptcy, bank-
ruptcy courts should have jurisdiction to hear cases involving
the imposition of the I.R.C. section 6672(a) tax penalty on
nondebtor corporate officers of debtor corporations.
II. BANKRUPTCY COURT POWER TO ENJOIN THE IRS
To determine the bankruptcy court's authority to enjoin
the IRS from collecting the I.R.C. section 6672(a) tax penalty,
the bankruptcy court's powers must be examined in light of the
Internal Revenue Code's Anti-Injunction Act.51 The Anti-In-
junction Act prohibits all suits to restrain collection of tax reve-
nues52 and thereby furthers the general purpose of the IRS to
collect revenues for the government. The Bankruptcy Code,
however, allows the bankruptcy court to determine the validity
of all taxes53 and to do what is necessary to carry out the Bank-
ruptcy Code provisions.54 The bankruptcy court's mandate is to
ensure the orderly rehabilitation of debtors and protection of
creditors.5 5 Although the Bankruptcy Code grants priority
51. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982). For the text of this provision, see supra
note 8.
52. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982). For the text of this provision, see supra
note 24.
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
55. The set of policies underlying the bankruptcy laws is often at odds
with the IRS's goal of revenue collection, forcing courts to favor one over the
other. See, e.g., Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1975), in
which the court stated:
We believe that the overriding policy of the Bankruptcy Act is the re-
habilitation of the debtor and we are convinced that the Bankruptcy
Court must have the power to enjoin the assessment and/or collection
of taxes in order to protect its jurisdiction, administer the bankrupt's
estate in an orderly and efficient manner, and fulfill the ultimate pol-
icy of the Bankruptcy Act.
Id. The Third Circuit, however, has taken a contrary view.
Congress has not chosen to include bankruptcy court adjudications
within the exceptions to § 7421(a).... Had Congress wished its 1966
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act to authorize bankruptcy courts to
issue injunctions against the collection of tax, we believe this inten-
tion would have been reflected in the amendments to 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a) enacted later that year.... [A] bankruptcy court exemption
cannot be judicially fashioned without contravening congressional in-
tent. Although there may be some merit in permitting the policy be-
hind the Bankruptcy Act to outweigh the rationale that underpins the




treatment to the I.R.C. section 6672(a) tax penalty by allowing
the government to receive payment over a period of no longer
than six years,56 there is no explicit statutory provision indicat-
ing whether the Internal Revenue Code or the Bankruptcy
Code takes precedence in the event of direct conflict.
5 7
Courts at all levels are split over whether the Bankruptcy
Code or the Internal Revenue Code takes precedence, and,
therefore, whether the bankruptcy court can enjoin the IRS.58
Courts concluding that the bankruptcy court cannot enjoin the
IRS generally follow a strict interpretation of the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act and refuse to enjoin an IRS action in any situation,5 9
while courts allowing the bankruptcy court to enjoin the IRS
balance the underlying policies of the bankruptcy laws and the
IRS mandate in relation to the particular circumstances of each
case.
6 0
Following the strict statutory construction approach, the
Third Circuit in Needham's Motor Service, Inc. v. Department
of the Treasury, IRS (In re Becker's Motor Transportation,
Inc.)61 held that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the bank-
ruptcy court from enjoining the IRS's collection efforts.62 In
Needham's Motor Serv., Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, IRS (In re
Becker's Motor Transp., Inc.), 632 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 916 (1981); cf Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1974) (the
overriding policy of the IRS to collect revenues for the government is reflected
in the Anti-Injunction Act's prohibition on suits to restrain tax collection).
56. For the text of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982), see supra note 5.
57. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (expressly providing for Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to supersede "any and all State
laws"). Beyond the fact of its enactment, the Anti-Injunction Act lacks any
legislative history that would aid interpretation in the event of conflict with
other federal statutory schemes. See Gorovitz, Federal Tax Injunctions and
the Standard Nut Cases, 10 TAX MAG. 446, 446 n.6 (1932); see also Note, En-
joining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Pro-
hibition, 49 HARV. L. REV. 109, 109 (1935) (legislative history of original anti-
injunction provision is "shrouded in darkness"). The Note explains that the
Congressional Record merely noted the progress of the provision without com-
ment and that contemporaneous newspapers noted its passage and no more.
Id at 109 n.9.
58. See supra note 12; infra note 99 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
61. 632 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
62. In arriving at its holding, the Third Circuit rejected the notion that
the bankruptcy court may apply old § 2a(2A) (now § 505 of the Bankruptcy
Code) to determine the tax liability of parties other than the debtor when the
debtor's rehabilitation is affected:
The determination by Congress that penalties and post-petition inter-
est which accrue on a tax debt are nondischargeable represents a
1986] 1295
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Becker, the plaintiffs filed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 and the IRS filed proofs of claim for the tax
debts and prepetition interest.63 The IRS, however, did not
complete the section of the proof of claim form indicating the
interest rate to be applied after confirmation of the plan.6
When the reorganization plan was confirmed, the debtors bor-
rowed money to make payments under the plan.65 The IRS
was paid in full, and, following distribution to other creditors
under the plan, the estate was closed and the debtors resumed
business. 66 Less than a year later, the IRS sought to collect
prepetition penalties and interest and postpetition interest on
the satisfied tax debts.67
The debtors asked the bankruptcy court to reopen the pro-
ceedings in order to seek declaratory and injunctive relief from
IRS collection efforts. After granting a reopening of the pro-
ceedings, the bankruptcy court enjoined IRS efforts to collect.68
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court injunction,
notwithstanding the Anti-Injunction Act, on the ground that
the rehabilitative purpose reflected in the Bankruptcy Act
overrides the force of the Anti-Injunction Act.69
On appeal by the IRS, the Third Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's decision in part, holding that the bankruptcy court
did not have the power to enjoin the IRS collection of the
prepetition penalties and postpetition interest absent explicit
statutory support.70 Although acknowledging the possible mer-
judgment that, at least in this context, the importance of financing
the federal government outweighs the value of debtor rehabilitation.
We are bound to adhere to that judgment, notwithstanding the sym-
pathetic plight of the rehabilitated debtor who has launched a fresh
beginning perhaps unaware of the vulnerability of his newly acquired
assets to the collection of such debts.
Needham's Motor Serv., Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, IRS (In re
Becker's Motor Transp., Inc.), 632 F.2d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450
U.S. 916 (1981). Chief Judge Seitz concurred with the majority in denying the
injunction, but wrote separately to state that he believed that the bankruptcy
court had the power to grant injunctive relief. Id. at 251 (Seitz, C.J., concur-
ring) (citing Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975)).
63. Id. at 244. The claim was for $74,792.04.
64. Id.
65. Id. The debtors borrowed $550,000.
66. Id
67. Id The plan was confirmed December 1, 1976, and in September,
1977, the IRS sought to collect these claims for $34,960.14 even though there
had been no notice of them during the arrangement of the plan. Id
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The court stated:
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its of giving greater weight to the bankruptcy policies, the
Third Circuit determined that Congress must expressly provide
for Bankruptcy Code provisions to take precedence over the In-
ternal Revenue Code.71 The court found that because the pen-
alties and interest were personal liabilities,72 rather than claims
against the estate, the Anti-Injunction Act applied.73
Similarly, one federal district court stated in Pressimone v.
IRS (In re Pressimone)74 that, despite laudable concern for the
rehabilitation of the debtor, the decision to enjoin the IRS is
nonetheless an inappropropriate substitution of the court's
judgment for that of Congress. In Pressimone, the IRS col-
lected the individual taxes due by levying against the salary of
the debtor's husband. Although the debtor was paying the
taxes through a confirmed Chapter 13 plan for individuals that
is substantially similar to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, the
court in Pressimone held that the Anti-Injunction Act pre-
vailed and vacated the bankruptcy court's restraining order.7 5
The Pressimone court reasoned by analogy to a Second Cir-
cuit case, Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 317 (In re Petrusch).76 In
Petrusch, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not have
jurisdiction to enjoin a labor union from picketing the debtor's
Had Congress wished its 1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act to
authorize bankruptcy courts to issue injunctions against the collection
of tax, we believe this intention would have been reflected in the
amendments to 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) enacted later that year. However
persuasive the arguments against application of § 7421(a) to bank-
ruptcy court adjudications may be, we believe that a bankruptcy court
exemption cannot be judicially fashioned without contravening con-
gressional intent. Although there may be some merit in permitting
the policy behind the Bankruptcy Act to outweigh the rationale that
underpins the anti-injunction legislation, such argument should be ad-
dressed to Congress.
I& at 246 (footnote omitted).
71. I&
72. Id at 248. Prepetition tax penalties, not allowable against the bank-
ruptcy estate, are personal liabilities of the debtor. Simonson v. Granquist, 369
U.S. 38, 40-41 (1962); World Scope Publishers, Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d
640, 641 (2d Cir. 1965). Postpetition interest is also a personal liability of the
debtor. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 360-61 (1964).
73. Becker, 632 F.2d at 251. Because prepetition interest was recoverable
against the debtor's estate, the court stated that the debtor's reliance on the
bankruptcy court's discharge and closing of the estate justified the imposition
of equitable estoppel against the IRS. The case was therefore remanded for de-
termination of the amount attributable to prepetition interest. Id. at 250-51.
74. 39 Bankr. 240 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. Id at 246.
76. 667 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1982).
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place of business because the Norris-LaGuardia Act 77 expressly
prohibits such injunctions by any United States court.78 There-
fore, the Pressimone court reasoned that, absent an express
provision in the Bankruptcy Code overriding the Internal Reve-
nue Code, the Internal Revenue Code's Anti-Injunction Act
takes precedence. 79
Another federal district court addressed the issue of in-
junctive power in dictum, focusing on several specific Internal
Revenue Code provisions including the Anti-Injunction Act.80
The court concluded that collection of revenues is of primary
importance to the government,8 1 noting that employers are re-
quired by law to withhold employees' FICA and income tax ob-
ligations and hold them in trust for the United States
77. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (prohibiting the issuing of restraining orders and
injunctions in cases "involving or growing out of a labor dispute").
78. Petrusch, 667 F.2d at 298-99.
79. The court stated:
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 ... is any reference made to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Such
omissions are to us self-evident proof that Congress never intended to
supersede or transcend it, since we cannot believe the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act was to be superseded, sub silentio.
Pressimone v. IRS (In re Pressimone), 39 Bankr. 240, 245 (N.D. N.Y. 1984) (cit-
ing In re Petrusch, 667 F.2d 297, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S.
974 (1982)).
80. United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46
Bankr. 741, 743 (M.D. Ga. 1985), affcZ 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
81. Id. According to the district court in Huckabee,
[t]he laws of the United States require all employers to withhold from
their employees' gross wages a scheduled amount representing the
employees' FICA and income tax obligations. As to the amount rep-
resenting income tax withholdings, the Internal Revenue Code states
that these amounts "shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the
United States." 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (1982) (emphasis added). If the em-
ployer violates this fiduciary obligation and misappropriates these
withholding funds (even if in a purported good faith effort to keep the
business afloat), the United States must nevertheless extend a credit
to the employees as if the funds were properly paid over to the gov-
ernment .... Because the government bears the loss caused by an
employer's defalcation, Congress has provided the government with
several remedies, one of which lies against the individual personally
responsible for the misappropriated funds .... This statute [I.R.C.
§ 6672] was intended to "cut through the shield of organizational
form" .....
Id. (citations omitted).
The purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982), was set
out in Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1961): "The manifest pur-
pose of § 7421(a) is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes al-
leged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal
right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund." Id. at 7.
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government. 82 I.R.C. section 6672(a) is thus a means of ensur-
ing that the funds will be collected and held in trust without
interference. The court stated that whether or not the IRS had
a policy of collecting taxes only once83 did not affect the statu-
tory power of the IRS to use the provision as a remedy.8 4 Ac-
cording to the court, I.R.C. section 6672(a) is distinct from and
supplementary to the tax itself.8 5
Further support for the contention that the bankruptcy
court lacks the power to enjoin an IRS collection effort lies in
the purpose of section 6672(a), which is to discourage employers
from using withheld tax funds for any purpose other than
taxes.8 6 Under I.R.C. sections 3102(a), 3402(a), and 3403, the
employer is liable for collection of the taxes.8 7 Similarly, under
I.R.C. section 7501 the employer is obligated to collect and hold
these taxes in trust for the government.8 8 Payment of these
taxes is thus an affirmative legal duty.
An additional argument advanced in support of the IRS's
position is that the nondebtor corporate officers should pay the
penalty and sue for a refund. This argument is, however,
flawed. In at least one case a court found that paying the
amount claimed by the IRS and then suing for a refund would
exceed the financial capacity of both the debtor and the
nondebtor corporate officers. 89 If corporate officers are pres-
sured to pay the taxes out of their own pockets, the incentive to
82. See 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (1982) (detailing employers' legal duty to withhold
employee's FICA and income tax).
83. For the text of the IRS policy, see supra note 7.
84. United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 46 Bankr. 741, 743-44 (M.D. Ga.
1985), affd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
85. Id.; see also Hornsby v. United States, 588 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1979)
(government not required to exhaust all remedies against debtor corporation
before protecting revenue with I.R.C. § 6672(a)).
86. See supra note 49.
87. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3102(a) (1982) (FICA taxes); id. §§ 3402(a), 3403
(income taxes).
88. See 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (1982).
89. Huckabee v. United States (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 43 Bankr. 306,
313 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Huckabee Auto
Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46 Bankr. 741 (M.D. Ga. 1985), affd, 783 F.2d
1546 (11th Cir. 1986). The IRS, on appeal, asserted that the Huckabees could
pay the tax and sue for a refund pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(a), even though the
Huckabees unsuccessfully protested the § 6672(a) tax penalty assessment at
the administrative level. Additionally, the IRS claimed that to maintain a suit
for a refund, the Huckabees need only pay the tax attributable to one em-
ployee for one fiscal quarter year. Brief for the Appellee at 26 n.17, United
States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Steele v.
United States, 280 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1960)).
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continue successful reorganization is reduced, and it becomes
more likely that the responsible officers will convert to Chap-
ter 7 liquidation.90 Under Chapter 7, as in Chapter 11, taxes
have priority;91 the government will be paid in full whether
sufficient funds remain for other unsecured creditors or not.
The responsible officers are guaranteed that no tax penalty will
be assessed against them personally.92 Requiring the responsi-
ble officers to pay the penalty and sue for a refund, therefore,
would very likely defeat the efficacy of a Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation plan, under which all creditors have a reasonable oppor-
tunity for payment.
In direct contrast to the strict constructionist analysis of
the Becker court, the Eighth Circuit in Bostwick v. United
States93 focused on the rehabilitative policy of the bankruptcy
laws and held that the bankruptcy court has the power to en-
join IRS collection efforts. Harry and Steva Bostwick, individ-
ual debtors, asked the bankruptcy court to enjoin the IRS from
collecting any tax debts until dischargeability of the tax debts
had been determined. 94 Because the IRS failed to file proofs of
claim, the Bostwicks contended that the tax debts were dis-
chargeable by the bankruptcy court.95 The IRS claimed that
the bankruptcy court did not have the power to enjoin the IRS
collection because of the Anti-Injunction Act.96 The Bostwick
court, however, stated that absent an express congressional
statement that the Internal Revenue Code takes precedence
over the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court had the power
to enjoin the IRS collection of the tax pending a determination
of the tax's dischargeability. 97 The court reasoned that the un-
derlying rehabilitative policy of the Bankruptcy Act requires
that the bankruptcy court have the power to protect the or-
derly administration of the bankrupt's estate.98
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982) (permitting a debtor in a chapter 11 re-
organization to convert to chapter 7 liquidation).
91. In liquidation cases, the debtor's assets are to be distributed among the
creditors in accordance with the priorities established by § 507. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 726(a)(1) (1982).
92. See supra note 7.
93. 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975).
94. I& at 742.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 744-45.
97. Id at 746-47.
98. The court stated:
Congress has evidenced an intention to enact a complete scheme gov-
erning bankruptcy which overrides the general policy represented by
the 'anti-injunction' act .... We believe that the overriding policy of
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Among the many courts following Bostwick,9 9 the bank-
ruptcy court in A & B Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. v.
United States (In re A & B Heating and Air Conditioning,
Inc.)100 held that, given Congress's silence, a bankruptcy court
could enjoin the IRS's efforts to collect an I.R.C. section 6672(a)
tax penalty assessed against the officer of a corporation operat-
ing under an approved Chapter 11 reorganization plan. 0 1 Re-
jecting the Pressimone court's analogy to In re Petrusch,0 2 the
court reasoned by analogy to NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.10 3 In
Bildisco, the Supreme Court determined that congressional si-
lence on the evident conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) meant that Congress
did not intend the NLRA to be excepted from the Bankruptcy
Code. 0 4 Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows the
trustee, with some exceptions, to assume or reject any execu-
the Bankruptcy Act is the rehabilitation of the debtor and we are con-
vinced that the Bankruptcy Court must have the power to enjoin the
assessment and/or collection of taxes in order to protect its jurisdic-
tion, administer the bankrupt's estate in an orderly and efficient man-
ner, and fulfill the ultimate policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
Id- at 744.
99. Old Orchard Inv. Co. v. A.D.I. Distribs. (In re Old Orchard Inv. Co.),
31 Bankr. 599, 603 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (bankruptcy court has equitable power to
enjoin creditor where claim arose out of partnership business); Jon Co. v.
United States (In re Jon Co.), 30 Bankr. 831, 834 (D. Colo. 1983); In re Otero
Mills, 25 Bankr. 1018, 1022 (D.N.M. 1982) (a proper consideration for enjoining
enforcement of a judgment against third parties is "the likelihood that such
enforcement will affect reorganization by detrimentally pressuring the bank-
rupt"); In re Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45 Bankr. 202, 208 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1984) (court enjoined the IRS from collecting an I.R.C. § 6672(a) tax pen-
alty from the corporate officers of a debtor corporation operating under an af-
firmed plan of reorganization); Driscoll's Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States(In re Driscoll's Towing Serv., Inc.), 43 Bankr. 647, 649 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984)
(injunction issued where IRS penalty would have a "chilling effect" on the re-
organization efforts of the debtor); Datair Sys. Corp. v. Starkey (In re Datair
Sys. Corp.), 37 Bankr. 690, 696-97 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1983); H & R Ice Co. v.
United States (In re H & R Ice Co.), 24 Bankr. 28, 31-32 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1982).
100. 48 Bankr. 397 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
101. Id at 401.
102. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
103. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
104. A & B Heating, 48 Bankr. at 400. As the court stated:
[I]n the Bildisco case, the Supreme Court... determined that at least
in that instance, congressional silence in the relevant provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, i.e. section 365 and the failure to carve out an ex-
ception superseded the applicable provisions of the NLRA and meant
that Congress did not intend to exempt labor contracts from the reach
of section 365(b).
Id (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)).
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tory contract. 0 5 The Supreme Court held that the debtor's
contract with the labor union fell within the meaning of "exec-
utory contract ' 0 6 and that the bankruptcy court could approve
unilateral rejection of the contract to protect the reorganization
of the debtor corporation. The A & B Heating court, analogiz-
ing to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bildisco, held that the
bankruptcy court had the power to enjoin the IRS from collect-
ing the tax penalty.'0 7 The court reasoned that "congressional
silence in the relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Code"'
0 8
does not indicate an intent to place the IRS outside the reach of
the bankruptcy court, particularly in light of the Bankruptcy
Code's provisions for payment of back taxes.'0 9
The conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the Inter-
nal Revenue Code in determining whether an injunction may
issue is well illustrated by a recent case 0 in which the bank-
105. 11 U.S.C. §365(a) (1982).
106. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 516.
107. A & B Heating, 48 Bankr. at 401.
108. Id
109. Id at 401. The Bildisco case provides greater support for the proposi-
tion that the bankruptcy court should have the power to weigh the equities.
The standard adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in REA Express is fundamentally at odds with the policies of flexibil-
ity and equity built into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
rights of workers under collective-bargaining agreements are impor-
tant, but the REA Express standard subordinates the multiple, com-
peting considerations underlying a Chapter 11 reorganization to one
issue: whether rejection of the collective-bargaining agreement is nec-
essary to prevent the debtor from going into liquidation. The eviden-
tiary burden necessary to meet this stringent standard may not be
insurmountable, but it will present difficulties to the debtor-in-posses-
sion that will interfere with the reorganization process .... [Tihe
Bankruptcy Court should permit rejection of a collective-bargaining
agreement . .. if the debtor can show that the collective-bargaining
agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the eq-
uities balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract.
Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525-26. The Court also stated:
Since the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful rehabilitation of
debtors, rejection should not be permitted without a finding that that
policy would be served by such action.... The Bankruptcy Court is a
court of equity, and in making this determination it is in a very real
sense balancing the equities, as the Court of Appeals suggested. Nev-
ertheless, the Bankruptcy Court must focus on the ultimate goal of
Chapter 11 when considering these equities. The Bankruptcy Code
does not authorize freewheeling consideration of every conceivable
equity, but rather only how the equities relate to the success of the
reorganization. The Bankruptcy Court's inquiry is of necessity specu-
lative, and it must have great latitude to consider any type of evidence
relevant to this issue.
Id at 527.
110. Compare Huckabee v. United States (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 43
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ruptcy court and the district court applied two opposing analy-
ses to the same facts. The bankruptcy court construed the two
codes as compatible,'1 1 but the district court stated in dictum
that the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code is
superior to the Bankruptcy Code.1 2 The bankruptcy court en-
joined the IRS from collecting a 100% penalty, notwithstanding
the Anti-Injunction Act."1 3 The bankruptcy court found a con-
flict between I.R.C. section 6672(a), permitting the IRS to col-
lect FICA and employee withholding taxes via a 100% penalty
against the corporate officers personally, and section 1129 of the
Bankruptcy Code, providing for payment of these same taxes
over a six-year period."L4 The bankruptcy court stated that
when two statutes conflict a court should try to construe them
in favor of coexistence. 115 It stated further that Congress did
not intend I.R.C. section 6672(a) to be applicable when the
taxes are being paid through a plan of reorganization. 1 6 The
bankruptcy court believed that allowing the IRS to collect the
tax penalty, with probable adverse affects on the debtor corpo-
ration, would defeat the rehabilitative purpose of bankruptcy.
Therefore, the bankruptcy court held that collection of the pen-
alty should be enjoined.117 The district court, in contrast, fol-
lowed a strict statutory approach and refused to permit
imposition of a "judicially created limitation" upon the statu-
Bankr. 306, 311-12 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984) (bankruptcy court opinion enjoining
IRS attempt to collect 100% tax penalty) with United States v. Huckabee Auto
Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 46 Bankr. 741, 743-44 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (district
court opinion reversing the bankruptcy court and holding that bankruptcy
court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the IRS), affd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.
1986).
111. See Huckabee, 43 Bankr. at 311.
112. See Huckabee, 46 Bankr. at 744.
113. Huckabee, 43 Bankr. at 312.
114. Id. at 311.
115. Id (citing Federal Aviation Admin. v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975)).
116. Id-
117. The court stated:
In this case, Debtor could not pay all creditors, and Debtor decided to
pay only those creditors necessary for the business to survive on a
day-to-day basis. Debtor then sought to pay its delinquent employ-
ment taxes through a Chapter 11 plan. Had Debtor paid the IRS
rather than the other creditors, the business probably would not have
survived. Congress, in the Bankruptcy Code, sought to encourage re-
organization, and its policies would be furthered by this construction.
Id at 311 n.9. The reorganization plan under § 1129 is structured so as to pro-
vide an orderly means of paying creditors in a legally recognized, prioritized
order with a discharge allowing the debtor to begin anew and provides for




tory right of the IRS to collect the tax penalty.118 The district
court stated that whether the penalty would harm the debtor
was irrelevant. Unless Congress provides express relief for the
nondebtor corporate officer of a debtor corporation in reorgani-
zation, the court determined, courts may not create such
relief.119
Other courts have used a balancing approach, which is es-
sentially a traditional common-law analysis, in deciding the ap-
plicability of the Anti-Injunction Act to the tax penalty
provision. In H & R Ice Company v. United States (In re H&R
Ice Company),120 for example, a case involving the validity of a
bankruptcy court injunction restraining the IRS from collecting
an I.R.C. section 6672(a) tax penalty from the officer of the
debtor company, the bankruptcy court held that an evidentiary
hearing would be necessary for consideration of several factors:
whether the debtor was operating under a confirmed plan that
included tax payments; whether the tax payments were being
timely made; whether there was any evidence to indicate actual
or threatened loss to the government; and whether the penalty
would adversely affect implementation of the reorganization
plan.121 Depending on its findings, the bankruptcy court stated
that it would have the power to enjoin the IRS despite the
Anti-Injunction Act. 2 2
In a nonbankruptcy context, the Supreme Court in South
118. Huckabee, 46 Bankr. at 744.
119. Id
120. 24 Bankr. 28, 32 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
121. Id.
122. I& at 31-32; see also Datair Sys. Corp. v. Starkey (In re Datair Sys.
Corp.), 37 Bankr. 690, 696 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). In Datair, the bankruptcy
court found it necessary and permissible to consider the equities and choose
between the government's need to collect taxes and the general rehabilitative
policy underlying the Bankruptcy Act. Id The debtor was afforded the oppor-
tunity to have the court consider the equities, id& at 696-97, but no subsequent
opinion is recorded.
Some courts have refused to enjoin the IRS collection of the tax penalty
from a nondebtor corporate office of a debtor corporation based on the com-
mon-law formula for issuance of an injunction, which requires the petitioner
to show that absent issuance of an injunction there will be irreparable harm
and that petitioner has no adequate remedy at law. See South Carolina v. Re-
gan, 465 U.S. 367, 381 (1984). See, e.g., Botta v. Scanlon, 288 F.2d 504, 506-08 (2d
Cir. 1961) (court recognized propriety of enjoining IRS when plaintiff can
show irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law but did not is-
sue injunction because plaintiff failed to make the required showing); Heller v.
Scanlon, 196 F. Supp. 832, 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (paying penalty and suing for a
refund constituted adequate remedy at law so injunction not issued).
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Carolina v. Regan m3 determined that the Anti-Injunction Act
did not bar suits to restrain tax collection when there would be
irreparable harm and no alternative remedy at law.-2 4 In this
case, South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and sought an in-
junction against the United States. The Supreme Court held
that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar a suit to restrain tax
collection because Congress had not provided an alternative
remedy-2 5 The Court took notice of the IRS position that an
acceptable remedy at law would be to pay the disputed tax and
sue for a refund.-2 6 The Court concluded, however, that "the
[Anti-Injunction] Act was intended to apply only when Con-
gress has provided an alternative avenue for an aggrieved party
to litigate its claims on its own behalf."'2 7 Absent an acceptable
alternative, therefore, a court may enjoin the IRS from collect-
ing a tax, notwithstanding the Anti-Injunction Act.
Allowing a court to enjoin the IRS from collecting a tax
penalty such as the I.R.C. section 6672(a) is reasonable in view
of the underlying goals of the IRS. Assuming that the overrid-
ing purpose of the Internal Revenue Code is to collect revenue,
the government loses virtually nothing by waiting for the peri-
odic payments made through the reorganization plan. The
Bankruptcy Code requires interest to be paid at a rate to match
the present value of the amount owed. 28 In contrast, the
threat to the reorganization plan, with or without an indemnifi-
cation of corporate officers by the corporation, derives from the
debtor's everpresent option to convert to Chapter 7 liquida-
tion. 2 9 Although the government receives full payment of the
taxes under either Chapter 11 or Chapter 7,130 other creditors
may be harmed if the debtor chooses to liquidate rather than to
reorganize.1 3 1 Construing the evident conflict between the
123. 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
124. Id, at 373, 378.
125. Id. at 373.
126. The Court cited an 1883 case to illustrate that this is a long-standing
rule. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 374 (1984) (citing Snyder v.
Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 193 (1883)).
127. Id at 381.
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 413, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 6369
(tax claims entitled to priority under § 507(a)(6) [currently § 507(a)(7)] may be
required to take deferred cash payments with the present value equal to the
amount of the claim.).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982).
130. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726, 1129 (1982).
131. Section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a reor-
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Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code so as to favor
coexistence, therefore, best protects the interests of the debtor,
the government and the other creditors. Accordingly, courts
should favor the less strict construction of the Anti-Injunction
Act so as to permit bankruptcy and article III courts to enjoin
the IRS when necessary to protect a viable reorganization plan.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between the bankruptcy court's need to pro-
tect debtors operating under a confirmed plan of reorganization
and the need for the IRS to use a penalty provision to collect
taxes due must be resolved in favor of the bankruptcy court.
The bankruptcy court must have jurisdiction to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether an injunction against the IRS is the
best course of action for all interested parties.
The rehabilitative purpose of bankruptcy reorganization
extends beyond the good of the individual debtor. The rehabili-
tated debtor becomes an economically productive, tax-paying
member of society again. If the IRS uses the tax penalty to col-
lect the taxes due immediately and the debtor corporation is
adversely affected and possibly forced into total liquidation, the
ultimate goal of protecting a stream of income to the govern-
ment is defeated. An immediate, one-time collection of delin-
quent taxes when installment payments are being made
destroys the debtor's ability to continue to produce a stream of
income and defeats the stated goal of collecting revenue. The
government will suffer a potentially greater long-term loss.
Rehabilitation of a bankrupt company will provide long-term
economic benefits to the debtor corporation's officers, share-
holders and employees, while continued tax payments will pro-
vide long-term benefits to the government. Perhaps more
important, creditors other than the government will receive
ganization plan be confirmed only if each holder of a claim within each class
"will receive or retain under the plan... property of a value ... that is not
less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor
were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title .... ." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)
(1982) (emphasis added). Practically, this means that each creditor will likely
receive more as a result of reorganization due to the continued existence of
the debtor.
For further discussion of the purpose of rehabilitation, see Jackson, Bank-
ruptcy, Non.Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE
L.J. 857, 857 (1982); Kennedy, Forward: Bankruptcy Reform-1973, 21 UCLA
L. REV. 381, 394 (1973); Shuchman, An Attempt at a Philosophy of Bankruptcy,
21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 420 (1973).
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better treatment if the debtor completes the plan of
reorganization.
Granting the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over an IRS im-
position of a tax penalty against a nondebtor corporate officer
of a debtor corporation and the power to enjoin the IRS if need
be does not mean the injunctive power must be exercised in
every case. Because the bankruptcy court hears the relevant
facts in determining the reorganization plan, the bankruptcy
court should have jurisdiction over actions that could adversely
affect the efficacy of the reorganization plan and the corre-
sponding power to enjoin the IRS if the facts of the case so dic-
tate. As long as the government is not threatened with an
ultimate loss of revenues, the bankruptcy court should have au-
thority to protect the integrity of the reorganization plan.
Deborah A. Dyson
